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THE DIVERSITY OF NORM PSYCHOLOGIES:
A CHALLENGE FOR THE LAW

PAUL SHELDON DAVIES*
“In most times and places, in-group loyalty and family honor have
trumped impartial fairness.” 1
ABSTRACT
Can we craft a coherent set of laws applicable to populations with
deep cultural diversity? The full force of this question—call it the
generalization challenge—has emerged recently thanks to advances
in the sciences of the human, especially theories of neuroscience and
psychology framed by theories of biological and especially cultural
evolution. The goal of this Article is to describe enough of those
advances to make clear the force of the challenge. The motivation is
simple: as we endeavor to imagine the future of law in light of
discoveries in neuroscience and related disciplines, being apprised of
the generalization challenge may increase our chances of discovering
an effective solution.

* Professor of Philosophy, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. Sincere
thanks to Peter Alces for his insights, constructive resistance, and forbearance, and to my
wife and daughter for their unflagging patience. I am grateful for helpful feedback from
discussants at the Imagining the Future of Law and Neuroscience Symposium where an
ancestral draft of this paper was presented. The symposium, generously sponsored by the
William & Mary Law Review, was held February 19-20, 2021. I am also grateful to the
William & Mary Law School students, especially Helen Brewer, who coordinated the
symposium events, and to the William & Mary Law Review editorial staff, especially Erica
Shuler, who edited this paper with remarkable care.
1. JOSEPH HENRICH, THE WEIRDEST PEOPLE IN THE WORLD: HOW THE WEST BECAME
PSYCHOLOGICALLY PECULIAR AND PARTICULARLY PROSPEROUS 294 (2020).
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INTRODUCTION
I take it for granted that any law, or any substantive portion of
any legal system, is acceptable only if it is psychologically fitting. A
law that assumes we are possessed of capacities we do not possess
is often irrelevant, perhaps pernicious, and indefensible.2 Further,
a law that overlooks the practical effects of psychological capacities
we do possess is unjustifiable. A necessary condition on almost any
defensible law, it seems, is that it fit, psychologically speaking, the
type of organism to which it is applied.3 Yet, according to recent
findings in sciences of the human—findings that bear on human
nature, especially neuroscience and psychology framed by theories
of biological and cultural evolution—there are substantial psychological differences across ethnolinguistic lineages within Homo
sapiens.4 There are, in particular, striking differences in so-called
norm psychologies, some of which are substantial enough to
generate a challenge for the law.5 This difficulty, which I refer to as
the generalization challenge, questions the feasibility of crafting a
coherent set of laws applicable to a deeply culturally diverse society.
I shall formulate the challenge this way:
(1) A set of legal norms is justified only if there exists (a) a
sufficient fit of those norms to the actual psychological constitution of the population and (b) a sufficient degree of psychological
homogeneity across the population.
(2) According to findings in sciences of the human, (b) is not
satisfied in ethnolinguistically diverse populations due to the
evolved diversity of norm psychologies; nor is (b) satisfied in a

2. Typically indefensible, but perhaps not always. Are there, or might there be, laws that
achieve their desired functions only because they are formulated on the assumption of
capacities we in fact lack?
3. The qualification—the “almost”—emphasizes the possibility acknowledged in the
previous footnote that some laws might be effective only if premised on a false assumption
about the capacities or incapacities of most citizens.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Parts III-V.
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single lineage in which the norm psychology of a substantial
proportion of individuals is fragmented or disunified.6
(3) In consequence, (a) is not satisfied in those populations.
Legal norms in ethnolinguistically diverse populations are likely
unjustified, as are norms in a single lineage comprising normatively disunified individuals.

I shall assume the truth of the first proposition and focus on the
second and third. In Part I, I sketch three sets of experiments that
demonstrate the diversity of norm psychologies in present-day
ethnolinguistic lineages. The goal is to motivate the generalization
challenge not by armchair speculation but with a theoretical
framework supported by experimental evidence. Part II raises an
obvious but important question concerning the depth and persistence of diverse norm psychologies, and Parts III-V attempt to
answer that question. I will, in addressing that question, describe
essential assumptions and empirical findings from theories of
cultural evolution and other sciences of the human. The force of the
generalization challenge, by the close of the Conclusion, should be
difficult to miss.
I. EVIDENCE OF DIVERSE NORM PSYCHOLOGIES
Vivid glimpses of the diversity of norm psychologies across
ethnolinguistic lineages are provided by recent experiments. It
suffices for present purposes to describe just three sets of experiments which, taken together, demonstrate substantive culturalhistorical differences in (i) moral motivations, (ii) the role of intentions in judgments of moral culpability, and (iii) attitudes and
practices concerning punishment.7 Before describing the experiments, however, a bit of clarification is in order concerning the relevant notions of “norms” and “norm psychology.”8 I will also introduce
a historical assumption thought to explain the evolutionary

6. For discussion of normatively disunified persons, see infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part I.A.
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emergence of the cultural diversity observed in the experiments
discussed here.9
A. Norm Psychology
The relevant sorts of norms are intersubjective and relative to
specific social groups, and they comprise some degree of internal
complexity.10 They comprise sets of shared expectations regarding
the actions and attitudes of some or all group members.11 These
expectations are in turn based upon common beliefs, practices, and
motivations that tend to be self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating.12
The within-group functions of such shared expectations, beliefs,
motivations, and practices include minimizing within-group
conflicts, heightening and stabilizing within-group cohesion and
cooperation, and conducing to the survival and perhaps the selective
advantage of the group.13 Indeed, according to leading theorists of
cultural evolution, cultural group selection has been an especially
powerful process in the evolution of human sociality, a process in
which the norms of one group enable it to flourish relative to other
groups.14 Robert Boyd, for instance, as well as Joseph Henrich,
Sarah Matthew, Peter Richerson, and others argue that withingroup norms can create, and in empirical fact have created,
sufficiently stable differences between neighboring groups to give
rise to such cultural group selection.15 Examples include norms for
dividing labor, sexual relations, child rearing, food production, food
sharing, the imposition of sanctions, and more.16
If norms comprise sets of shared expectations relevant to group
cooperation, a norm psychology comprises a set of mechanisms for
9. See infra Part I.B.2.
10. See DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 280 (1988).
11. Id.
12. See HENRICH, supra note 1, at 71.
13. See Daniel C. Feldman, The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms, 9 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 47, 48 (1984).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT BOYD, A DIFFERENT KIND OF ANIMAL: HOW CULTURE TRANSFORMED
OUR SPECIES 98-106 (2018).
15. See generally Peter Richerson et al., Cultural Group Selection Plays an Essential Role
in Explaining Human Cooperation: A Sketch of the Evidence, 39 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIS. 1
(2016).
16. See id. at 8, 11, 13-15.
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acquiring and adhering to those norms.17 Those mechanisms endow
organisms with a range of capacities, including the ability to
identify shared norms in the course of interacting socially; the
natural disposition to learn and internalize those norms; and the
disposition to act on those norms, including the affective and
cognitive dispositions to call out and sanction those who violate
norms—especially in populations in which free riders pose a threat
to group cohesion.18
The apparently deep-seated norm of impartiality in Western
ethical and political theorizing is illustrative. An impartial concern
or respect for all persons, or for all practically rational beings (which
may include nonhumans), is taken as a core condition of adequacy
for any theory of morality or justice.19 More modestly, the perspective of an ideally sympathetic observer is taken as a core condition
of adequacy.20 Either way, it appears that a prominent norm,
embedded in the psychology of many Western societies today, is
that any action or policy or institution that is partial, that fails to
include all rational beings or the perspective of an ideally sympathetic observer within its scope, should be regarded with suspicion
and must, to earn its justificatory keep, provide compelling grounds
for its breach of impartiality.21
Yet theories of cultural evolution make clear that this assumption of wide-scope impartiality is by no means universally endorsed
across our species today.22 This bears on the large-canvas historical
17. See Maciej Chudek & Joseph Henrich, Culture-Gene Coevolution, Norm-Psychology
and the Emergence of Human Prosociality, 15 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 218, 218-20 (2011).
18. See JOSEPH HENRICH, THE SECRET OF OUR SUCCESS: HOW CULTURE IS DRIVING
HUMAN EVOLUTION, DOMESTICATING OUR SPECIES, AND MAKING US SMARTER 188-89 (2016);
see also BOYD, supra note 14, at 96-106, 118-20.
19. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 16-17 (Mary
Gregor & Jens Timmermann eds. & trans., 2012).
20. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 13-17 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., 1976).
21. For a discussion of impartiality in the context of the judiciary, see generally William
Lucy, The Possibility of Impartiality, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (2005); Kathy Mack &
Sharyn Roach Anleu, Performing Impartiality: Judicial Demeanor and Legitimacy, 35 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 137 (2010); Melissa E. Loewenstern, Note, The Impartiality Paradox, 21 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 501 (2003).
22. See Michelle Ann Kline et al., Variation Is the Universal: Making Cultural Evolution
Work in Developmental Psychology, 373 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 20170059, 2-3
(2018).
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assumption mentioned above and discussed below.23 According to
Henrich, wide-scope impartiality became a core component in the
norm psychology of some ethnolinguistic lineages mainly as an
effect of the rise of Christianity and, in particular, what eventually
became the Western Catholic Church.24 Prior to the 800-year period
between, roughly, the years 400 and 1200 CE during which the
Western Church took hold in parts of Europe, most human societies
were structured almost entirely upon kinship relations.25 In preChristian Europe, norms of partiality were foundational.26 All of
one’s obligations—whom one could marry, where one could live,
ownership responsibilities, who had legal decision-making power
over whom, et cetera—were defined by reference to one’s blood- and
affinal-relations, as well as relations to other tribal or clan members.27 Norms of impartiality, if any, were limited to the treatment
of members within the same familial or social class within the same
group, tribe, or clan.28
The crucial consequence of this dramatic difference between
Christian and pre-Christian Europe, at least for present purposes,
is twofold. First, most contemporary ethnolinguistic lineages that
exist today descend from societies altered little or not at all by the
rise of Western Catholicism.29 In consequence, most persons alive
today are endowed with a norm psychology different from that
assumed by Smith or Kant and their successors.30 Kin-based
partiality appears to be normatively deep, if not normative bedrock,
for most humans today.31 Second, social scientists are beginning to
23. See infra Part I.B.2.
24. See HENRICH, supra note 1, at 191-92.
25. Id. at 162-63.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Joseph Henrich et al., Most People Are Not WEIRD, 466 NATURE 29, 29 (2010)
(defining “WEIRD” as “people from Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic ...
societies”).
30. Id.
31. For evidence of this claim, see id.; see also Jeffrey J. Arnett, The Neglected 95%: Why
American Psychology Needs to Become Less American, 63 AM. PSYCH. 602, 608-09, 611 (2008).
It goes without saying that the extent to which many countries today qualify as WEIRD is a
matter of degree. The WEIRD/non-WEIRD distinction refers to a continuum, or a messy set
of continua. For an extremely interesting attempt at quantifying the extent to which countries
qualify as WEIRD, see generally Michael Muthukrishna et al., Beyond Western, Educated,
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discern this and other norm-related differences in contemporary
societies insofar as they can compare divergent ethnolinguistic
lineages of Homo sapiens alive today. This, in fact, is the general
format of most of the experiments I am about to describe.
B. Experimental Evidence
Most of these experiments compare diverse lineages. Some
lineages descend from ancestors directly affected by the rise of the
Western Church. Others descend from ancestors more or less
untouched by the Church, whose moral and legal norms, as a result,
tend to retain a discernible partiality toward kin. Given this
comparative framework, it is difficult to overstate the implications
of these experiments for understanding the diversity of norm
psychologies.
1. First Set: Moral Motivation
In the first experiment, subjects from fifty countries32 answered
questions concerning the following vignette:
You are riding in a car driven by a close friend. He hits a
pedestrian. You know he was going at least 35 miles per hour in
an area of the city where the maximum allowed speed is 20
miles per hour. There are no witnesses. His lawyer says that if
you testify under oath that he was only driving 20 miles per
hour it may save him from serious consequences. What right
has your friend to expect you to protect him?33

The subjects in this experiment could select one of the following
responses to the vignette:
(1a) My friend has a definite right as a friend to expect me to
testify to the lower figure [20 miles per hour].

Industrial, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) Psychology: Measuring and Mapping Scales of
Cultural and Psychological Distance, 31 PSYCH. SCI. 678 (2020).
32. FONS TROMPENAARS & CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER, RIDING THE WAVES OF CULTURE:
UNDERSTANDING DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL BUSINESS 45 (4th ed. 2021).
33. Id. at 44.
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(1b) He has some right as a friend to expect me to testify to the
lower figure.
(1c) He has no right as a friend to expect me to testify to the
lower figure.34

After choosing from among those responses, subjects were asked
what they think they would do if faced with this situation: Would
they testify that their friend was driving at the lower speed, or
would they refuse to testify?35
The results are striking for their unambiguous cultural diversity.
Well over 90 percent of persons in Canada, Switzerland, and the
United States chose either the second or third response and said
they would refuse to testify in support of their friend.36 This is prima
facie evidence of a psychology in which the norm of impartiality is
potent enough to override one’s affections for and obligations to
one’s close friends. In other countries, such as South Korea, Russia,
and Venezuela, by contrast, only around one-third of persons indicated such impartiality.37 Around two-thirds of persons in those
countries said they would lie in court to save their friends from legal
consequences.38 These results39 converge with data from the World
Economic Forum concerning hiring practices. Countries with
stronger kin-based norms, for instance, hire more relatives into
senior management positions.40 Although it is, perhaps, wise to hire
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 45.
37. See id. at 45-46.
38. See id.; see also HENRICH, supra note 1, at 208-09 (citing Jonathan Haidt & Jesse
Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals
May Not Recognize, 20 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 98, 103-05, 108 (2007)) (describing converging results
from Haidt and Graham’s analyses of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire).
39. Actually, the results of this experiment, updated in the book’s fourth edition, are
noteworthy for their complexity. For instance, only 43 percent of subjects in Italy, a country
undoubtedly affected by the rise of Western Catholicism, said they would refuse to testify to
protect their friend. More than half were apparently willing to act in a clearly partial manner.
See TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 32, at 45. Perhaps Henrich’s historical
hypothesis needs to be supplemented with other causal factors? Or perhaps recent patterns
of migration from non-Western countries to Italy suffice to resolve the apparent challenge to
Henrich’s view?
40. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 208; see also Jonathan F. Schulz et al., The Church,
Intensive Kinship, and Global Psychological Variation, 366 SCIENCE 707, 710-12 (2019).
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trustworthy persons into positions of authority, Westerners who
have internalized norms of impartiality would nonetheless judge
differently.
Another experiment in this first set was designed to tease out the
diversity of moral motivations by looking at patterns of actual
behavior, rather than answers to questionnaires. For example,
consider behaviors that produce public goods. Donating blood is a
public good despite being costly in terms of time, discomfort, and
possible (though unlikely) complications.41 It is also anonymous, as
donors rarely know who will receive the blood they donate.42 When
Henrich and colleagues examined data from the World Health
Organization concerning blood donations across 141 countries, they
uncovered a clear correlation between strong, kin-based norms and
infrequent blood donations.43 Donations in countries with weak
family ties were admittedly low, at roughly twenty-five donations
per 1000 people per year, but donations in countries with the
strongest indicators of kinship were much lower.44 They were, in
fact, close to zero.45 Almost no blood donations for unknown persons
are made in countries with strong kin-based institutions, irrespective of various factors such as religion, geography, and ecology.46
The extent to which a society is structured by kin-based relations
predicts with accuracy the relative frequencies of blood donations.
However, weak family ties do not predict frequent donations.
Societies with relatively weak kin-based norms vary widely in the
frequency of blood donations.47 Henrich tentatively concluded that
psychologies constituted more by impartial norms—those influenced
less by kin-based norms—are significantly more inclined toward
actions that contribute to the public good.48 In addition, Henrich
41. See, e.g., HENRICH, supra note 1, at 212; Antonio Crocco & Domenico D’Elia, Adverse
Reactions During Voluntary Donation of Blood and/or Blood Components. A StatisticalEpidemiological Study, 5 BLOOD TRANSFUSION 143, 145-46 (2007).
42. E.g., Ronald Sullivan, Blood Donors’ Anonymity Is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 1987),
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/29/nyregion/blood-donors-anonymity-is-upheld.html
[https://perma.cc/L9RQ-TA5C].
43. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 212-13.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 213.
48. See id.
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concluded that the observed variation regarding which particular
public good actions are performed is explicable by other, yet-to-be
measured variables.49
2. Second Set: Intentions in Moral Judgments
In the second set of experiments, researchers presented two
similar vignettes in which only a single variable is altered.50 Both
scenarios involve a person taking the possessions of another
person.51 In one case the taking is intentional—an unambiguous
instance of deliberate theft—while in the other case the taking is
clearly accidental.52 As with the first set of experiments, subjects in
this experiment come from societies with contrasting histories and
social norms.53 Some subjects live in countries structured by
intensive kin-based relationships, while others live in societies
structured more by norms of impartiality.54 The key question is
whether subjects assess the moral status of the two vignettes
similarly or differently.55
Unsurprisingly, subjects in Western countries are likely to judge
that the moral status of the two cases differs substantially.56
Intentional theft is prima facie morally blameworthy, while
unintentional taking is either not blameworthy or far less so.57 That
is indeed what this experiment reveals. Out of the ten countries
covered in this study, two were Western (or at least Westernleaning): the United States and Ukraine.58 Subjects in both
countries drew a strong distinction in their moral assessments of
the two vignettes.59 What is remarkable, however, is that subjects
in the other eight countries drew either a significantly weaker
distinction or, in the case of subjects from Fiji, Namibia, New
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 213-14.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50.
See id. at 50-51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 49-51.
Id. at 50-51.
Id.
Id. at 50.
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Ireland, and Tanzania, no distinction at all!60 In countries little
affected by the historical erosion of kin-based relations due to the
rise of Western Catholicism, accidental taking is judged as morally
equivalent to intentional theft.61 The prima facie significance of this
kind of ethnolinguistic diversity for the law is difficult to exaggerate given the essential role of intentions in establishing criminal
liability in Western legal systems.62
Other experiments in this set focused on the same issue—the role
of intentions in moral judgments—with regard to different categories of morally charged actions. In addition to stealing versus
accidentally taking another person’s belongings, investigators also
collected judgments of intentional versus unintentional (1) attempts
to kill via actions that carry a high probability of causing death, like
poisoning a community water well; (2) attempting to assault
another person; and (3) violating a food taboo.63 The results from the
latter categories, especially killing and assaulting, converge on the
same results concerning stealing: kin-structured societies tend, in
their moral judgments, to treat the unintended harms as equivalent to those that were intended, whereas non-kin-structured
societies tend otherwise.64 These results hold even when potential
confounds, such as differences in educational backgrounds, are
accounted for.65
It is clear from these experiments that citizens of societies
structured by strong kin-based norms afford little significance to
intentions in their moral judgments, while those in societies with
weak kin-based norms afford substantial moral significance to
intentions. What explains this dramatic difference in norm psychologies? Henrich suggests two potential factors.
The first is that intensive kinship norms regulate members of a
social group far more by shame than guilt, whereas norms of
impartiality in groups with weak kin-based relations regulate
60. Id. at 50-51.
61. See H. Clark Barrett et al., Small-Scale Societies Exhibit Fundamental Variation in
the Role of Intentions in Moral Judgment, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 4688, 4691-93 (2016)..
62. See CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (Sanford H. Kadish
et al. eds., 10th ed. 2017).
63. Barrett et al., supra note 61, at 4689-90.
64. Id. at 4690-91.
65. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 220.
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members far more by guilt.66 In kin-intensive societies, individuals
attend mainly to the effects that their actions have on their kin.67
The merit or demerit of their actions is assessed according to the
effects on the group as a whole or at least on some portion of the
whole.68 If, for instance, the action of a Yasawan male hunter in Fiji
disappoints or besmirches the reputation of his kin or clan, he is
likely to experience shame.69 His intentions, whether good or ill, will
not alter the burden inflicted on the group.70 More generally, the
experience of shame need not track the intentions with which one
acts, nor even the performance of an action.71 Possessing a trait that
brings disrepute to one’s parents or extended kin—a lack of courage,
talent, or beauty—is sufficient to trigger shame.72
Guilt, by contrast, typically tracks intentions.73 Why do persons
who live in groups regulated by impartial norms tend to experience
guilt more than shame? If the norms internalized in that group
apply more or less equally to kin and non-kin (including strangers),
then the target of one’s attention is indeterminate or at least
diffuse.74 It may include persons unknown to us.75 Even in relatively
small clans, however, it is challenging to assess the effects of my
action on everyone, and in clans of any size it is practically impossible. When this is the case—when assessing the actual practical
effects of our actions on all or most members of our social group is
not feasible—we can, at least, assess the level of intentional good
will or intentional malice with which we act. If, for example, I act
with the sincere intention to benefit as many people as possible,
then, even if you cannot discern the actual effects of my action, you
have some grounds—the sincerity of my intentions—for morally
judging my action.76 Intentions, on this view, are a heuristic with

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 221.
See id. at 34-35, 202.
See id. at 34.
See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 140-41.
See id. at 144, 188, 199.
HENRICH, supra note 1, at 34-35, 201-02.
See id. at 34, 201-02.
See id. at 34-36.
See id. at 36.
See id. at 34-35.
See id. at 219-20.
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which to assess the moral value of an action by instead assessing
the quality of the intention that likely caused the action.77
The second factor suggested by Henrich concerns analytic
thinking. Suppose we understand “analytic” thinking as essentially
a matter of classifying objects, actions, or events as tokens of
relatively abstract types.78 For example, when shown a picture of
three objects—a rabbit, carrot, and cat—and asked which of the
other two objects “goes with” the rabbit, analytic thinkers will pick
the cat.79 Why? Because rabbits and cats are both tokens of the
general type “mammal” or even “animal.”80 But what if subjects pick
the carrot instead of the cat? In that case, it seems reasonable to say
that objects, actions, or events are classified not as tokens of an
abstract type but rather in terms of concrete, practical relationships
that regularly obtain.81 A rabbit “goes with” carrots because of the
very concrete relationship between the thing that eats and things
that are eaten.82 This latter way of thinking is “holistic.”83
With this analytic/holistic distinction on the table, experiments
show that holistic thinking is more pervasive in kin-based societies
and analytic thinking is more pervasive in less kin-based societies.84
This difference accords with the explanation that Henrich’s first
factor offers. In a society structured mainly with kin-based norms,
the moral assessment of my action is determined largely by its
effects on my group.85 Hence the affective efficacy of shame. That
77. See Jeff Elison, Shame and Guilt: A Hundred Years of Apples and Oranges, 23 NEW
IDEAS PSYCH. 5, 25 (2005).
78. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 53.
79. Id.
80. Id. But that is not all. As Henrich notes, studies by Richard Nisbett and colleagues
reveal a striking difference between Euro-Americans and East Asians in what they attend to
and how they perceptually process images and objects such as a picture of a street scene. Id.
(citing Yuri Miyamoto et al., Culture and the Physical Environment: Holistic Versus Analytic
Perceptual Affordances, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 113, 118 (2006)). Euro-Americans attend to and
interpret the scene in terms of individual objects, properties of those objects, and the abstract
categories to which those objects belong. See id. By contrast, East Asians attend to the scene
in terms of the whole and interpret objects not in terms of their individual properties but
instead in terms of their relations to other objects and the larger whole. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 53-55. Henrich calls the rabbit, carrot, and cat test the “Triad Task.” Id. at 53.
84. See id. at 53-54 fig. 1.9 (depicting data from the Triad Task administered to over 3,000
subjects).
85. See id. at 208-09.
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affective efficacy, however, does not travel alone. Persons raised to
judge their actions by the effects on one’s clan are also likely to
acquire causally relevant perceptual and cognitive dispositions—
dispositions attuned to the psychology of concrete, family-related
relationships.86 Thus, they are likely to pair a carrot but not a cat
with the rabbit, given the concrete relationship between eaters and
the things eaten. By contrast, persons raised to judge actions
impartially, in terms of wide-scope norms, are likely to acquire the
disposition to think in terms of relatively abstract categories,
including the category of “all persons.”87 That category, as just
noted, is often impractical. It is typically not possible to assess the
effects of any single action on all persons. A suitable proxy, it seems,
are the intentions on which we act. The moral assessment of an
action, given the prevalence of norms that tend toward impartiality,
is based on relatively abstract generalizations concerning the
apparent intentions with which persons act and the moral value of
their actions.88
3. Third Set: Punishment
As with moral motivation and the role of intentions in moral
judgments, there is a deep difference between kin-based and nonkin-based societal views regarding the status of punishment. One
such difference concerns the punishment of persons who are not
members of a person’s own clan or society. As Henrich describes, in
societies with weak kin-based norms it is not merely permissible,
but in some circumstances admirable, and perhaps obligatory, to
punish someone who violates a norm, even if the violator is a
complete stranger and even if the violation poses no direct harm to
the person who punishes.89 If I see a stranger shoplifting in the
grocery store, I will likely feel compelled to report what I see to the
store manager. If I turn a blind eye to the violation, I am likely to
feel guilty. These affective responses are evidence that I have
internalized a social norm in which third-party punishment is
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 208-09, 216.
See id. at 43-45.
Id. at 219-20.
Id. at 216-17.
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expected, even required.90 By contrast, in societies with strong kinbased norms, punishment is largely insular.91 Punishment of
persons within a person’s clan typically falls to tribal elders and is
unlikely to provoke offense, while punishing a member of a different
clan is bound to offend.92 It is bound to offend members of the other
clan enough to result in violent retribution against the outsider,
would-be punisher.93 This is the key difference: third-party punishment that extends beyond one’s kin, while sanctioned in low-kin
societies, is regarded as an affront, even a threat, in high-kin
societies.94
Evidence of this difference comes from Public Goods Games.95 The
Games are designed to force subjects to choose between acting from
self-interest and acting for the public good.96 In one version, four
players, all strangers to each other, are given the same quantity of
money.97 Each player is asked to decide how much of the money he
or she is willing to contribute to a public-goods project.98 Players are
informed that after contributions are made, the total sum is increased by 50 percent and the new, increased sum is then distributed equally to all four players.99 The crux of the game is that
because the project is for some public good, all four players receive
an equal share of the increased sum, and in many instances that
makes it individually rational to try to ride for free.100 If, for instance, all four players are given an initial sum of $20 and all four
contribute their entire sum to the group project, the $80 sum is
increased to $120 and divided equally.101 Each player has now
gained $10. But if only three of the four contribute their entire sum
to the group project and the fourth contributes nothing, then when
90. See id.
91. Id. at 216.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 216-17.
95. See generally Geoffrey E. Nunn & Thayer H. Watkins, Public Goods Games, 45 S.
ECON. J. 598 (1978).
96. E.g., id. at 598-99.
97. E.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE
137, 137 (2002); see also HENRICH, supra note 1, at 217.
98. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 97, at 137.
99. Id.; see also HENRICH, supra note 1, at 217.
100. See, e.g., Fehr & Gächter, supra note 97, at 137.
101. See id.

2022]

DIVERSITY OF NORM PSYCHOLOGIES

1183

the $60 sum is increased to $90 and split four ways, the three who
contributed their entire $20 receive only $22.50 in return. The freeriding fourth player, by contrast, is now sitting on the tidy sum of
$42.50 (his initial $20 plus the public good payout).102
The most revealing finding is what happens when the game is
altered to permit players to punish free riders over several rounds.
When this version of the Public Goods Game is given to university
students in countries with low-kin-based norms, most players are
willing to punish free riders even at a cost to themselves.103 When
that happens, the frequency of free riding decreases and cooperation goes up.104 The imposition of third-party sanctions on complete
strangers produces a pronounced increase in group cooperation.105
By contrast, when the same version is given to university students
in Eastern European or Middle Eastern countries, the effects over
several rounds are dramatically different.106 Some players do indeed
punish free riders, but free riders who are punished often try to
retaliate in later rounds.107 As Henrich puts it, free riders who have
been punished by someone they do not know, perhaps someone who
is not a member of their clan, apparently seek revenge against
whomever punished them.108 Notably, free riders cannot identify the
specific players who paid to punish them—all contributions, including paid punishments, are anonymous—but that does not deter
enraged free riders.109 They instead lash out at any player who
might have been the one to impose the initial punishment against
them.110 In some versions, this form of retaliatory punishment
completely undermines the cooperation-enhancing effects of thirdparty sanctioning.111
102. See id.
103. See HENRICH, supra note 1, at 217-18.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 217. For the general claim that costly punishment increases cooperation, see
generally Fehr & Gächter, supra note 97.
106. See HENRICH, supra note 1, at 217-18.
107. See id.; see also Simon Gächter & Benedikt Herrmann, Reciprocity, Culture and
Human Cooperation: Previous Insights and a New Cross-Cultural Experiment, 364 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 791, 800 (2009).
108. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 217-18.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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4. Summary of All Three Sets
Based on the above experiments (and others I have not mentioned), it is reasonable to conclude that a substantial diversity of
norm psychologies across ethnolinguistic lineages exists in Homo
sapiens today.112 Cultural evolution is indeed a powerful producer
of affective and cognitive diversity in our species, a diversity that
includes the divergent norm psychologies just described. The
generalization challenge, therefore, is real. In countries comprising
ethnolinguistically diverse lineages, it is a challenge not only for
lawmakers, but also for those creating effective policy in areas like
immigration, education, and more.
II. THE STAYING POWER OF NORM PSYCHOLOGIES?
That there exists substantial diversity among cultural-historical
norm psychologies is a fact with which we must reckon—or so it
seems. Yet much depends on the depth and staying power of that
diversity. The experiments just described, though compelling, do not
reveal how entrenched the differences in norm psychologies are.113
They do not tell us, for instance, whether and at what rate the
norm psychology of individuals raised in an intensively kin-based
society would change if they emigrated to a less kin-based society
(or vice versa). If most of the diversity would disappear in a few
years or a single generation, then the generalization challenge
merits, at most, modest concern as we try to imagine the future of
the law in light of the sciences of the human.
I assume, at any rate, that the generalization challenge is a
substantive problem for the law only if there is a plausible answer
to the question concerning the staying power of diverse norm
psychologies. As we will see, the most plausible view at present is
that there is no singular answer to this question, because much
depends on the details specific to actual cases.114 That said, there

112. See supra Part I.B.1-3.
113. See supra Part I.B.
114. See generally Daniel J. Hruschka & Joseph Henrich, Economic and Evolutionary
Hypotheses for Cross-Population Variation in Parochialism, 7 FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE
1 (2013).

2022]

DIVERSITY OF NORM PSYCHOLOGIES

1185

are compelling theoretical and empirical grounds for the general
claim that in a nontrivial range of cases, ethnolinguistic differences
in norm psychologies are likely to persist long enough to generate
substantive, on-the-street challenges to extant systems of morality
and of law.115 The goal of the remainder of this essay is to describe
some of these grounds.
The most potent grounds for the staying power of the diversity of
norm psychologies derive from the theoretical core of theories of
cultural evolution.116 These are three core theses: (1) Homo sapiens
today, far more than any other known species, is constituted, in
part, by an evolved suite of capacities dedicated to cultural learning;117 (2) this suite of cultural learning capacities coevolved with
the accumulation and perpetuation of cultural knowledge;118 and
(3) understanding the coevolution of cultural learning and cumulative knowledge involves the application of three distinct evolutionary processes: (a) cultural learning and cumulative knowledge
are plausibly anchored in ancestral capacities that are largely the
products of gene-based evolution; (b) but some of those ancestral
capacities have since been extended and altered to fit a specific
cultural ecology by way of culture-gene coevolution; and (c) once our
ancestral capacities for learning and our cumulative knowledge
evolved above some threshold, the stage was set for nongenetic
cultural evolutionary changes that can alter our biology without
altering our genomes.119
Although all of (1)-(3) are integral to understanding cultural
evolution, I will focus mainly on (3): the threefold taxonomy of
115. See infra Part III.
116. There are several excellent book-length presentations of theories of cultural evolution
published in the last decade or so. For a few that combine wide-scope coverage with theoretical depth, see generally HENRICH, supra note 1; BOYD, supra note 14; KEVIN N. LALAND, DARWIN’S UNFINISHED SYMPHONY: HOW CULTURE MADE THE HUMAN MIND (2017); HENRICH, supra
note 18; KIM STERELNY, THE EVOLVED APPRENTICE: HOW EVOLUTION MADE HUMANS UNIQUE
(Tom Roeper ed., 2012); ALEX MESOUDI, CULTURAL EVOLUTION: HOW DARWINIAN THEORY CAN
EXPLAIN HUMAN CULTURE & SYNTHESIZE THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2011).
117. See HENRICH, supra note 1, at 63.
118. See id. at 63-65.
119. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (40th Anniversary ed. 2016);
Herbert Gintis, Gene-Culture Coevolution and the Nature of Human Sociality, 366 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 878 (2011); EVA JABLONKA & MARION J. LAMB, EVOLUTION IN
FOUR DIMENSIONS: GENETIC, EPIGENETIC, BEHAVIORAL, AND SYMBOLIC VARIATION IN THE
HISTORY OF LIFE (rev. ed. 2014).
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evolutionary processes that comprise cultural evolution as a whole.
The importance of (1) and (2) will be noted as needed.
The coevolution of cultural learning and cumulative cultural
knowledge is, as I say, a product of three evolutionary processes:
(a) Gene-based evolution
(b) Culture-gene coevolution
(c) Nongenetic cultural evolution120

I will illustrate each of these processes with actual examples to
illuminate the depth of diversity among norm psychologies and
evaluate the resulting effects on the staying power of those psychologies. I begin with the processes and products of gene-based
evolution.
III. GENE-BASED EVOLUTION
The processes in gene-based evolution are familiar from basic
evolutionary theory. Kettlewell’s well-known study of the selective
effects of melanism in the peppered moth is illustrative.121 So, too,
are the effects of psychological mechanisms more or less universal
to Homo sapiens—mechanisms that presumably emerged prior to
robust cultural selection—that are now generatively entrenched in
our development,122 and some which were foundational for the later
emergence of culture-gene coevolution. These include mechanisms
that were causally integral in sexual attraction, pair-bonding,
parental care (in mammals), kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and
more.123
120. This threefold taxonomy of evolutionary processes is taken directly from Henrich. See
generally HENRICH, supra note 18.
121. See generally BERNARD KETTLEWELL, THE EVOLUTION OF MELANISM: THE STUDY OF A
RECURRING NECESSITY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDUSTRIAL MELANISM IN LEPIDOPTERA
(1973).
122. I take the notion of “generative entrenchment” from William Wimsatt. See WILLIAM
C. WIMSATT, RE-ENGINEERING PHILOSOPHY FOR LIMITED BEINGS: PIECEWISE APPROXIMATIONS
TO REALITY 133-34 (2007).
123. Jaak Panksepp, the father of affective neuroscience, identified several primary-process
affective systems, largely in subcortical structures, that are functionally homologous across
the many mammalian species studied thus far. Some of those systems—LUST, CARE, and
PANIC/GRIEF—are among the evolved mechanisms central to pair-bonding, kin selection,
and more. See JAAK PANKSEPP, AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN AND
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These also include, however, psychological mechanisms that were
causally integral to rudimentary forms of cultural learning.124 These
are psychological adaptations—mechanisms favored by gene-based
selection—that endowed our ancestors with the cognitive and
affective capacities to effectively acquire strategic information,
beliefs, practices, and normative regularities from those with whom
we live.125 Before sampling a few of the mechanisms for cultural
learning in our own species, however, it helps to observe analogous
(perhaps homologous, in some instances) mechanisms in nonhuman, even nonmammalian, species. For, as Kevin Laland
observes, strategic copying of behavior is ubiquitous in the biological
realm.126 It has been studied in the predator-evasion behaviors of
monkeys, the feeding behavior of rats, nest-site choices in birds,
mating behavior of quail and even stickleback fishes, and in many
more contexts.127 What is clear in all these cases is that the
acquisition of strategic information and practices from conspecifics
more often than not increases the fitness of those who copy.128 It is
also clear that such social “learning” requires little or nothing in
the way of conscious awareness of the longer-term consequences of
one’s actions; it is a product of cognitive and affective capacities that
are integral to the mental architecture of the relevant species and
that typically operate below conscious awareness.129
The same two points apply to cultural learning in humans. The
mechanisms with which present-day humans acquire strategic
information and practices from conspecifics are clearly part of our
species-wide architecture and typically operate with little or no
conscious deliberation. This is clear from studies performed on
persons of all ages, but it is perhaps clearest from cross-cultural
studies performed on children as young as twelve months.130 When
one-year-olds are confronted with a novel, ambiguous object, they
ANIMAL EMOTIONS 4 (1998). See generally JAAK PANKSEPP & LUCY BIVEN, THE ARCHAEOLOGY
OF MIND: NEUROEVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF HUMAN EMOTIONS (2012).
124. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 36.
125. See id. at 34-53 (providing an overview of the gene-based evolution of such
mechanisms).
126. See LALAND, supra note 116, at 31, 55-57.
127. Id. at 32-33, 40-41, 47.
128. Id. at 76.
129. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 40.
130. Id. at 41.
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typically engage in social referencing by attending to the emotional
expression of a caregiver or other adult for guidance.131 If the mother
smiles or offers encouragement, the infant will approach the unfamiliar object.132 If the mother expresses fear, the infant moves
away.133 However, just two months later, the child’s strategy for
dealing with unfamiliar features of the environment is expanding.134
By fourteen months, toddlers begin to attend preferentially to others
whom they perceive to be relatively skillful or successful.135 If, for
instance, they observe one adult who acts confused while interacting with some object and a second adult who acts with confidence,
the toddlers, when given the opportunity to interact with the same
object, preferentially copy the actions of second adult over the
first.136 They attend to differences in skill and success, and they copy
the behavior of the relatively skillful and successful.137
Moreover, by thirty-six months there is a discernible increase in
the child’s ability to retain and recall previous observations; threeyear-olds retain and copy the relatively skillful actions that they
observed several days earlier.138 In addition to copying the actions
of relatively competent adults, infants and toddlers also copy the
actions of those perceived to be relatively prestigious,139 those who
are similar to themselves in sex140 and ethnicity,141 and those whom

131. Id.
132. Id. at 41-42.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 42.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Maciej Chudek et al., Prestige-Biased Cultural Learning: Bystander's Differential
Attention to Potential Models Influences Children's Learning, 33 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV.
46, 48-49 (2012).
140. See, e.g., Carol Lynn Martin & Jane K. Little, The Relation of Gender Understanding
to Children’s Sex-Typed Preferences and Gender Stereotypes, 61 CHILD DEV. 1427, 1436-38
(1990); Carol Lynn Martin et al., Children’s Gender-Based Reasoning About Toys, 66 CHILD
DEV. 1453, 1467 (1995); Elizabeth A. Reynolds Losin et al., Own-Gender Imitation Activates
the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 7 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 804, 809 (2012).
141. See David Buttelmann et al., Selective Imitation of In-Group over Out-Group Members
in 14-Month-Old Infants, 84 CHILD DEV. 422, 426-27 (2013); see also Katherine D. Kinzler et
al., Children’s Selective Trust in Native-Accented Speakers, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 106, 10910 (2011).
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they perceive to be older.142 It bears emphasizing that the psychological dispositions displayed in these studies are not learned.143 To the
contrary, these experiments indicate that they are part of the
architectural machinery with which infants and toddlers engage in
highly strategic cultural learning.144
A more specific example of gene-based evolution concerns
parochialism. As Hruschka and Henrich construe the term,
parochialism is a person’s psychological tendency to guide his
actions in accordance with perceived cues of “social closeness.”145
The notion of social closeness is vague and challenging to operationalize. One way to fix the idea is by group membership. You and
I are “socially close” if we belong to the same family, the same social
organization, et cetera.146 Another way is by subjective assessments
based on spatial metaphors.147 Whichever way we specify the
empirically discernible effects of the concept, we may use it to
measure differences in social closeness across social groups. We may
do so by assessing a range of behaviors, including the extent to
which individuals in one group avoid those from other groups
(avoidance), the extent to which individuals in one group distribute
resources that favor members of their group (favoritism), and the
extent to which individuals rank family members and friends as
better than other persons (ingroup bias).148 The crucial finding for
our purposes is twofold. First, these three measures of parochialism
are highly positively correlated across many countries—countries
high in one measure are high in all three.149 Second, across those
countries, all three measures are positively correlated with material

142. See, e.g., Vikram K. Jaswal & Leslie A. Neely, Adults Don’t Always Know Best: Preschoolers Use Past Reliability over Age When Learning New Words, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 757, 758
(2006).
143. See, e.g., id.
144. See id.
145. Hruschka & Henrich, supra note 114, at 2.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
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insecurity and/or weak governmental institutions.150 Parochialism
trends upward as security trends downward.151
Now, data for the first claim—the positive correlation between
avoidance, favoritism, and ingroup bias—derive from a study of 186
small-scale societies, which might limit the scope of the second
claim—the correlation between parochialism and insecurity and/or
weak institutions.152 Those data, however, converge with evidence
from several other sources, including studies on the effects of modernization, especially the effects of industrialization on material
security.153 These studies draw on multigenerational data from 191
countries, comprising nearly eighty societies worldwide, “including
some of the richest and poorest nations in the world.”154 As Pippa
Norris and Ronald Inglehart argue, religious or spiritual beliefs
tend to persist in the face of industrialization even while affiliation
in religious institutions declines.155 Their key hypothesis is that material security is inversely related to the need for social affiliation
in the larger community.156 As security increases, affiliation in
religious institutions decreases, and spiritual needs, which do not
decline at the same rate as institutional affiliation, are increasingly
addressed by way of solitary activities rather than by institutional
ties.157
The suggestion here, then, is that the relationship between
parochialism and material security described by Hruschka and
Henrich, because it mirrors the parallel relationship between
religiosity and material security described by Norris and Inglehart,
may well reflect an entrenched feature of human psychology.158 It
may be the product of gene-based selection that occurred prior to
widespread evolutionary changes wrought by culture-gene
150. See Daniel J. Hruschka & Joseph Henrich, Institutions, Parasites and the Persistence
of In-Group Preferences, 8 PLOS ONE, May 2013, at 1, 4.
151. See id.
152. See Hruschka & Henrich, supra note 114, at 3.
153. See, e.g., PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, SACRED AND SECULAR: RELIGION AND
POLITICS WORLDWIDE 24-25 (2004).
154. Id. at 34.
155. Id. at 18.
156. See id.
157. See Ronald Inglehart & Wayne E. Baker, Modernization, Cultural Change, and the
Persistence of Traditional Values, 65 AM. SOCIO. REV. 19, 47-49 (2000).
158. See Hruschka & Henrich, supra note 114, at 5.
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selection.159 If so, it illustrates the evolutionary processes in genebased evolution with respect to a set of traits directly relevant to the
generalization challenge. I will return to this illustration shortly.160
IV. CULTURE-GENE COEVOLUTION
The evolutionary processes in culture-gene coevolution are of
particular importance in examining the depth of diversity among
norm psychologies. These can occur in any population capable of
producing cultural items, the effects of which alter the selective
forces acting on that population, thereby increasing the probability
of gene-based selection for new or altered capacities for navigating
those new selective forces.161 Henrich makes the point vividly:
The central argument in this book is that relatively early in our
species’ evolutionary history, perhaps around the origins of our
genus (Homo) about 2 million years ago ... cultural evolution
became the primary driver of our species’ genetic evolution. This
interaction between cultural and genetic evolution generated a
process that can be described as autocatalytic, meaning that it
produces the fuel that propels it. Once cultural information began to accumulate and produce cultural adaptations, the main
selection pressure on genes revolved around improving our
psychological abilities to acquire, store, process, and organize
the array of fitness-enhancing skills and practices that became

159. This hypothesis is also plausible given the evolutionary functions of the subcortical
PANIC/GRIEF system discovered by Panksepp. See PANKSEPP & BIVEN, supra note 123, at
313-14.
160. Alternatively, the evolution of the inverse relationship between parochialism and
security may be more a product of culture-gene coevolution than gene-based evolution (it could
certainly be the outcome of both processes). See infra Parts IV-V. Some of the psychological
mechanisms that implement parochialism—for example, those that bias us towards our
kin—may have been the entrenched products of gene-based selection. Once cultural differences across neighboring groups began to emerge, and once competition between distinct
cultural groups increased above some threshold, robust interactions between parochialism
and cultural institutions within each group may well have resulted in culture-gene evolution.
See, e.g., BOYD, supra note 14, at 98-106. This hypothesis, which Henrich and other theorists
dub “cultural group selection,” see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text, is thought to
explain the occurrence of a wide range of culture-specific changes, including genetic changes,
by appeal to the selective pressures imposed by intergroup competition.
161. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 57.
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increasingly available in the minds of the others in one’s
group.162

Moreover, and crucially for the persistence of diverse norm
psychologies, Henrich is explicit that culture-gene coevolution can
and, in some cases, clearly has altered the genomes of ethnolinguistically distinct populations within our species.163 The best
documented cases include the evolution of blue eyes, an aversion to
rice-based alcohol, and, the poster illustration of culture-gene
coevolution, lactose tolerance in adults.164 As Henrich notes, Kevin
Laland and colleagues, well over a decade ago, identified over 100
genes affected by recent selective pressures that are plausibly
cultural in nature.165 There are also cases, noted by Henrich, in
which social structures clearly affect the human genome.166 Studies
by Hiroki Oota and colleagues reveal compelling evidence that
patrilocal residence produces a relatively low degree of variation in
Y chromosomes, while matrilocal residence produces relatively less
variation in mitochondrial DNA.167
The crucial claim, then, is that the same culture-gene coevolutionary processes that selected for physiological changes such as
alcohol aversion or lactose tolerance would have simultaneously
selected for associated practices and social norms. This is an
important point. Changes in physiology that bear on health, vigor
for reproduction, and longevity do not operate in a norm-free
manner.168 They unavoidably engender changes in shared expectations concerning the production and proper use of the relevant
cultural items.169 It is thus highly probable that culture-gene
selection for changes in physiology would typically be accompanied
162. Id. What Henrich refers to as an “autocatalytic” process is, I believe, the same process
that Tennie, and others, refer to as “ratcheting up the ratchet.” See id.; Claudio Tennie et al.,
Ratcheting up the Ratchet: On the Evolution of Cumulative Culture, 364 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC’Y B 2405, 2405-06, 2412-13 (2009).
163. HENRICH, supra note 18, at 200.
164. Id. at 85, 88-90.
165. Id. at 92; Kevin N. Laland et al., How Culture Shaped the Human Genome: Bringing
Genetics and the Human Sciences Together, 11 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 137, 137 (2010).
166. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 92.
167. Hiroki Oota et al., Human mtDNA and Y-Chromosome Variation Is Correlated with
Matrilocal Versus Patrilocal Residence, 29 NATURE GENETICS 20, 20-21 (2001).
168. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 108, 168, 187, 318.
169. See id.
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by culture-gene selection for changes in culture-specific social
norms:
Here’s the idea: cultural evolution gave rise to a variety of
different social norms, so different groups became increasingly
characterized by different practices and expectations about such
things as marriage, exchange, sharing, and rituals. Then, natural selection acting on genes responded to this world governed
by social norms by endowing individuals with the cognitive
abilities and motivations to help them better navigate and
adaptively learn. The success of persons growing up in this
emerging landscape of social norms depended—at least in
part—on their ability to acquire the appropriate social norms for
their own group and to preferentially target their interactions
toward those most likely to share their norms.170

If this is correct—if culture-gene coevolution has produced geneanchored capacities across our species for acquiring norms that are
culture-specific and for responding preferentially to others who
share the same cultural norms—then the diversity of norm psychologies that gives rise to the generalization challenge has staying
power with considerable depth.
The range of traits in present-day humans plausibly produced by
culture-gene evolution spans, at minimum, the broad categories of
“marriage, exchange, sharing, and rituals.”171 My goal here is to
describe just three well-studied cases of culture-gene coevolution.
The second and third cases, in particular, illustrate the apparent
staying power of diverse norm psychologies.
A. Agricultural and Biological Coevolution
The first case, however, is the relatively simple poster illustration
of culture-gene coevolution mentioned above: the coevolution of
agriculture and lactose tolerance in some human adults. Archeological evidence suggests that in some (not all) ancestral populations
there was selection for a genetic mutation that produces the
relevant enzyme in ancestors who, around 10,000 years ago, began
170. Id. at 200.
171. Id.
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domesticating animals.172 The transition from nomadic to agrarian
life, it appears, spread slowly over a period of several thousand
years.173 Because figuring out how to grow, store, and protect crops
no doubt required extensive trial and error, it is plausible that the
capacity to digest the protein- and fat-rich milk of other animals
sustained ancestral adults who otherwise would have died out in
seasons of low agricultural yields.174 If so, there would have been
intense selection for any genetic mutation that enabled adults to
digest milk without the deleterious effects of lactose intolerance.175
Now, we know that culture-gene evolution requires the relative
stability of cultural selective pressures over several generations.176
In general, culture-gene evolution occurs when (1) stable selective
pressures imposed by cultural items tend to favor genetic mutations
for capacities that enable organisms to make better use of evolving
cultural items; (2) changes in organismic capacities tend, in turn, to
result in the production of new cultural items and improvements to
current ones; (3) a new round of cultural items or improvements
once again alters the selective pressures, which tend to select for
mutations for improved capacities with which to utilize those cultural items; and so on.177 This is the process, as Claudio Tennie
describes it, of ratcheting up the ratchet.178
B. Marriage: Pair-Bonding and Culture Coevolution
Now consider one of the broad categories mentioned by Henrich:
the cultural evolution of various forms of marriage.179 A cultural
institution that presumably taps into our gene-based disposition for
pair-bonding,180 marriage is striking both for the unity of its
172. Pascale Gerbault et al., Evolution of Lactase Persistence: An Example of Human Niche
Construction, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 863, 864-67, 872-73 (2011).
173. See id. at 866-67.
174. See id. at 865-66.
175. See id. at 866.
176. Id. at 863-64.
177. Tennie et al., supra note 162, at 2405-06, 2413.
178. See generally id.
179. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 145-46.
180. See BERNARD CHAPAIS, PRIMEVAL KINSHIP: HOW PAIR-BONDING GAVE BIRTH TO HUMAN
SOCIETY 158, 162 (2008). For another marvelous work on marriage, see Joseph Henrich et al.,
The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage, 367 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 657, 659 (2012).
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evolutionary function—enhancing the production of viable offspring—and for the diversity of practices and associated norms
across distinct cultures.181 The ways in which marriage enhances
viable offspring are difficult to miss. It transforms what might
otherwise be short-term pair bonds, few of which have been monogamous throughout most of human history, into long-term bonds,
many of which become more or less monogamous.182 The reasons are
clear. In cultures where monogamous marriage is prevalent, there
is greater paternal certainty that one’s children are one’s genetic
offspring, and this likely increases male investment.183 In addition,
marriage produces in-laws by joining together families that may not
be closely related by blood.184 These and other factors expand the
base of material and social support for the children of married
couples, making it easier to raise not only more children but also
children who will likely grow into competent, reproductively
successful adults.185 The evolutionary payoff of marriage is unsurprising.
What is surprising about marriage is the cultural diversity of
norms with which it is practiced. One such set of norms is less about
the “practice” of marriage than its suppression. As Henrich describes, families in the Na and other ethnic groups in China are, in
a substantive sense of the term, fatherless.186 There are “biological”
fathers, providers of sperm, but these genetic fathers provide no
material support for the offspring they produce.187 Na households
are female-run and families are matrilineal.188 Since pregnancy is
mainly a consequence of secretive, short visits by men, paternity is
not an issue.189 Indeed, genetic fathers may not know they are
biological fathers and may have no idea which children are their

181. See Henrich et al., supra note 180, at 657-60, 665-66.
182. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 146-47.
183. See id. at 146; Bryan D. Neff, Decisions About Parental Care in Response to Perceived
Paternity, 422 NATURE 716, 718 (2003).
184. HENRICH, supra note 18, at 147; see also Mark Dyble et al., Inclusive Fitness for InLaws, BIOLOGY LETTERS, Oct. 17, 2018, at 1, 1.
185. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 147.
186. Id. at 150.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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biological progeny.190 Although genetic fathers provide no material
support to their own offspring, men are expected to support children
born to their sisters.191 Such fatherlessness is even apparent linguistically: there are no words in the local language for “husband,”
“father,” or “in-law.”192 Yet, despite the cultural institutions and
norms that suppress pair-bonding in these groups and result in
fatherless families, those norms and institutions have proven
remarkably stable.193
Contrast the fatherless Na with the Barí in Venezuela and the
Aché in Paraguay, where many children have multiple fathers.194
Among the Barí, for instance, it is apparently believed that a
successful pregnancy requires multiple ejaculations of sperm.195
Women are thus encouraged to have sex with more men than just
their husbands.196 When, at birth, the mother names the additional
men with whom she had intercourse, those men become secondary
fathers and are expected to provide material support for the baby.197
Studies of the Barí and the Aché show that children with two
“fathers” are more likely to survive past age fifteen than children
with just one father.198
As Henrich notes, however, Barí and Aché husbands are not
indifferent to their wives having sex with other men. They experience sexual jealousy.199 This, I believe, is significant to the question
concerning the persistence of diversity among norm psychologies.
We are supposing that pair-bonding is a gene-based capacity that
190. See CAI HUA, A SOCIETY WITHOUT FATHERS OR HUSBANDS: THE NA OF CHINA 227-28
(Asti Hustvedt trans., 2001).
191. HENRICH, supra note 18, at 150.
192. Id.
193. Id. This is, on its face, a remarkable example of cultural evolution suppressing, or at
least altering substantially, the expression of a powerful species-wide, genetically based trait.
194. Id. at 149-51; Stephen Beckerman et al., The Barí Partible Paternity Project, Phase
One, in CULTURES OF MULTIPLE FATHERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PARTIBLE PATERNITY
IN LOWLAND SOUTH AMERICA 27, 32 (Stephen Beckerman & Paul Valentine eds., 2002).
195. HENRICH, supra note 18, at 151.
196. Id.
197. See Beckerman et al., supra note 194, at 32-33.
198. HENRICH, supra note 18, at 151. The same studies show that children with three or
more “fathers” do worse than those with exactly two. Id. This is puzzling. Henrich offers a
plausible explanation: responsibility increasingly diffuses as the number of secondary fathers
increases. Id. at 352 n.18.
199. Id. at 151.
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evolved prior to the rise of substantial cultural evolution. We may
now add that sexual jealousy probably belongs in the same category.
Sexual jealousy, we may assume, coevolved in tandem with pairbonding, and today these two ancient mechanisms may reinforce
one another. A substantial practice of monogamy may well keep
sexual jealousy more or less at bay, while the threat of jealous
outbursts may stabilize the practice of monogamy.200 If so, then, for
any hypothesis concerning the cultural evolution of marriage, we
must consider the potential causal interactions of these generatively
entrenched traits: pair-bonding and sexual jealousy.
Here, then, is why this is significant. Norm psychologies will be
less (or more) resistant to change than others, depending on how
effectively the culturally evolved institutions coordinate the entrenched genetically based mechanisms from which they, the
cultural institutions, have evolved.201 The question concerning
diverse norm psychologies with respect to marriage is this: How
effectively do these diverse cultural institutions of marriage—
those, for instance, in Barí versus those in the United States—
coordinate the predictable causal effects of pair-bonding and sexual
jealousy?
Here is what seems to be a reasonable, albeit speculative,
answer.202 The culturally evolved institution of marriage among the
Barí is plausibly less stable and more tenuous than the institution
that evolved among present-day Westerners due to the asymmetrical burden imposed on Barí husbands.203 As noted, husbands in the
Barí culture experience sexual jealousy;204 apparently, the culturegene coevolutionary pressures that gave rise to Barí marriage
norms did not select against mechanisms of male sexual jealousy.
The result is that those men, presumably by virtue of some set of
200. All this is in addition to the norm-based practices that function as third-party
monitors of violators and as potential sources of sanctions. Consider, for instance, the power
of gossip to diminish or burnish a person’s reputation. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 146.
201. See generally id.
202. Although reasonable, the following illustration is oversimplified along several
dimensions. For instance, the burdens imposed on husbands need to be balanced against
burdens imposed upon wives, grandparents, in-laws, and so on. All of these burdens,
moreover, need to be compared with and balanced against the real or perceived benefits that
accrue to other parts of Barí culture.
203. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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beliefs and norms, are pressured or otherwise incentivized to ignore,
tamp down, or channel feelings of sexual jealousy.205 By contrast, in
present-day Western countries, there is no widespread normative
expectation that husbands tolerate their wives being intimate with
other men.206 In countries like the United States, marriage comes
with the normative expectation, even if not the widespread or
consistent practice, of monogamy.207 The normative burden on
Western husbands with regard to sexual jealousy is, at least on its
face, less than it is on Barí husbands.208
Let us suppose, if only for the sake of argument, that this
asymmetry in the burdens imposed on husbands in both cultures is
real. In that case, the effect of this asymmetry on the resistance to
change among norm psychologies is likely substantial. If a heterosexual married couple from the United States were to become Barí
citizens, the husband (and perhaps the wife) would likely find the
difference in normative expectations psychologically insurmountable. After all, present-day Western men belong to a lineage in
which entrenched mechanisms for pair-bonding and for sexual
jealousy have worked more or less in tandem for centuries.209 Were
a Western husband to try to assimilate to life with the Barí, he
would likely be slow to lose the normative expectations concerning
monogamy and much slower to internalize the marriage norms of
the Barí. By contrast, if a heterosexual couple from the Barí were to
become citizens of the United States, the husband (and perhaps the
wife) would likely find the normative expectations less daunting.
The transition from having to manage or bypass feelings of sexual
jealousy to not having to manage such feelings (or, at most, having
to manage them on a smaller scale) would plausibly result in a
substantial reduction of psychological stress for the husband.
205. See Beckerman et al., supra note 194, at 32.
206. Léa J. Séguin, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Lay Attitudes and Perceptions of
Polyamory, 22 SEXUALITIES 669-70, 683-86 (2019).
207. See Kelly Campbell & David W. Wright, Marriage Today: Exploring the Incongruence
Between Americans’ Beliefs and Practices, 41 J. COMPAR. FAM. STUD. 329, 334-37 (2010).
208. I wish to emphasize I am not committed to the truth of this narrative. Nor am I
suggesting that one norm psychology is preferable to the other. I am committed to the
hypothetical claim that, if this narrative is correct, then the norm psychology of the Barí
probably has less staying power than other norm psychologies in which sexual jealousy is
triggered less frequently.
209. See Séguin, supra note 206, at 670, 672.
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If this supposition is on track, we may draw two substantive
conclusions. First, the staying power of any norm psychology is a
causal consequence, in part, of how effectively the evolved cultural
institutions (for example, norms of marriage) coordinate the effects
of generatively entrenched mechanisms (for example, pair-bonding
and sexual jealousy) from which those cultural institutions evolved.
Second, the truth of this first conclusion illustrates one way in
which at least some parts of our norm psychologies have substantial
staying power. Some are more resistant to change insofar as they
better coordinate the outputs of our generatively entrenched mechanisms.
C. The Cultural Coevolution of Impersonal Trust
The third case of culture-gene coevolution is intended to reinforce
and extend the lesson just drawn from the case of diverse marriage
norms. Let us circle back to the first set of experiments in Part I
concerning moral motivation.210 The upshot of those experiments is
that internalized moral motivations tend to diverge as cultures
differ in the degree of kin-focused institutions. Members of intensely
kin-based cultures are far more partial in their moral motivations
than members of cultures with weaker kin-related institutions.211
As Henrich argues, present-day countries that are “WEIRD”212—
that are Western and relatively Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and
Democratic—are comparatively obsessed with impartial moral
motives compared to less WEIRD countries.213 What I wish to highlight, as in my discussion of marriage norms, are the ways in which
the staying power of a norm psychology depends on how well the
relevant norms coordinate the causal effects of our generatively
entrenched mechanisms.
One relevant generatively entrenched mechanism concerns
interpersonal trust, a mechanism probably selected for in distant
ancestors in the context of kin selection. Recall the experimental
210. See supra Part I.B.1.
211. See HENRICH, supra note 1, at 305-07.
212. See Henrich et al., supra note 29, at 29.
213. See generally HENRICH, supra note 1; Joseph Henrich et al., The Weirdest People in the
World?, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIS. 61 (2010) (providing an earlier statement of the general
view).
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finding, described in Part I, that leaders of companies in kin-based
countries hire far more relatives into positions of senior management than company leaders in WEIRD countries.214 Norms that
permit or perhaps require that sort of practice plausibly rest upon
a high degree of trust between kin.
There is, however, a mechanism for an opposing form of trust, a
trust that can develop between strangers. Henrich describes this
form of trust as impersonal and speculates that it probably first
emerged in impersonal market exchanges.215 Commercial exchange
in markets where most participants are strangers to one another is
a social situation in which all players, to reap the anticipated
benefits of commerce, are incentivized to internalize a common set
of expectations and prescriptions.216 Such norms would plausibly
emerge as a substitute to kin-focused norms in the regulation of
behavior. As these impartial norms take hold, psychological mechanisms for impersonal trust are likely selected for, and eventually
impersonal trust begins to generalize to other types of potentially
fruitful interactions with strangers.217 It is thus no accident,
according to Henrich, that as commercial exchange in Europe
emerged, a broad range of institutions in which strangers interact
with one another for a range of common purposes also began to
emerge—including guilds, churches, monasteries, universities, and
more.218
Here, then, is the point about the staying power of diverse norm
psychologies. If a mechanism for impersonal trust is now part of the
psychological repertoire of WEIRD persons today, it plausibly
requires the tamping down of our generatively entrenched mechanisms for interpersonal trust—mechanisms that presumably arose
in the course of kin selection millions of years ago. It probably also
requires the emotional wherewithal to venture away from kin
relations based on interpersonal trust and to simultaneously quell
what would have been a deep-seated fear of strangers. It thus
214. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
215. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 48.
216. See id. at 290-94; see also Christian Thöni, Trust and Cooperation: Survey Evidence
and Behavioral Experiments, in TRUST IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS 155, 156-58 (Paul A.M. Van
Lange et al. eds., 2017).
217. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
218. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 322-29.
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seems reasonable to speculate that the norm psychology associated
with impersonal trust has less staying power than the psychology
associated with interpersonal trust.
That, however, may be overly hasty. If Henrich’s historical
hypothesis is correct—if norms of impersonal trust emerged as
market norms took hold219—then norms of impersonal trust that operate mainly in WEIRD countries may also have staying power. The
deep-seated fears of interacting with strangers that our ancestors
experienced may have been mitigated in some lineages by the
enhanced prospects of survival and the range of satisfactions that
a market economy can produce. Since mechanisms that bear on
survival and pleasure are likely among the most generatively
entrenched parts of our psychology, the staying power of newer
norms for impersonal trust may be comparable to, or perhaps
greater than, those for the presumably much older mechanisms of
interpersonal trust.220
I take it that, at present, we do not know which form of trust, if
either, has greater staying power in extant norm psychologies. We
nonetheless may draw two substantive conclusions. First, if one
form of trust, as a matter of empirical fact, has greater staying
power than the other, then there exists another asymmetry in the
staying power of the corresponding norm psychologies, an asymmetry parallel to the one concerning marriage norms.221 This seems, in
fact, a genuine possibility. After all, the much older mechanisms
for interpersonal trust still exist even in robustly WEIRD countries
today.222 They still exert considerable influence within our norm
psychologies. How could it be otherwise if those mechanisms run
deep in ancient mechanisms favored by kin selection?
It is no surprise, for instance, that the moral intuitions of many
Westerners, despite avowed commitments to impartial norms, do
not contest the moral permissiveness of preferring the well-being of
their own children, even in instances where we know that opportunities afforded our children are opportunities denied to other

219.
220.
221.
222.

See id. at 302-04.
See id.
See supra Part IV.B.
See HENRICH, supra note 1, at 258-59, 262-63.

1202

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1167

children.223 If an asymmetry along these lines is empirically defensible, then we can conclude yet again that the staying power of
norm psychologies is a function, in part, of the success with which
culturally evolved mechanisms coordinate the effects of generatively entrenched mechanisms.
To see the second conclusion, suppose the staying power of both
forms of trust is equal across a range of environments. Suppose
impersonal trust coordinates the effects of certain entrenched
psychological mechanisms as effectively as interpersonal trust coordinates the effects of ancient mechanisms produced by kin
selection. If that were the case, we would be faced with an interestingly different version of the generalization challenge—a challenge
due not to diversity between distinct ethnolinguistic lineages, but
to norm diversity within a single lineage. The challenge is that there
would exist lineages comprising individuals whose psychology contains mechanisms for opposing forms of trust. That, I take it,
describes the norm psychology of present-day persons who are truly
WEIRD. For we, like all members of our species, are plausibly
endowed with entrenched mechanisms for interpersonal trust, but
we are also endowed, unlike non-WEIRD persons, with mechanisms
for impersonal trust.224 The problematic diversity is a conflict built
into the very architecture of WEIRD norm psychologies.225
In general terms, WEIRD persons today are normatively fragmented or disunified. In a range of cases, our kin-related trust,
along with our deeply partial attachments and expectations, comes
into conflict with our disposition to trust strangers—a trust that
includes internalized expectations of impartial treatment.226 One
concrete illustration of our normative fragmentation is friendship.227
As Alexander Nehamas describes, the ineliminable partiality of
friendship cannot be reconciled with an unrelentingly impartial
moral perspective.228 He illustrates the inherent conflict this way:
223. See Hohjin Im & Chuansheng Chen, Cultural Dimensions as Correlates of Favoritism
and the Mediating Role of Trust, 27 CROSS CULTURAL & STRATEGIC MGMT. 417, 423-28 (2020).
224. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 299-300.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 22.
227. For a cultural evolutionary approach to friendship, see DANIEL J. HRUSCHKA,
FRIENDSHIP: DEVELOPMENT, ECOLOGY, AND EVOLUTION OF A RELATIONSHIP 2-3 (2010).
228. ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, ON FRIENDSHIP 187-88 (2016).
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“If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying
my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country,”
E.M. Forster once wrote, recalling that Dante cast Brutus and
Cassius in the lowest circle of Hell because in assassinating
Caesar, they had forsaken not their country but their friend.229

In killing Caesar, Brutus and Cassius betrayed two forms of trust:
the impartial trust embodied in laws against murder and the partial
trust between friends. Nehamas, along with Forster, assigns greater
merit to love between friends and thus the partial form of trust.230
Yet both of those authors, presumably like most readers of this
Article, no doubt qualify as WEIRD.231
The generalization challenge in this case is twofold. First, how do
we design a coherent set of laws that applies to even a single lineage
that is WEIRD and thus normatively disunified? The challenge
arises whenever our mechanisms for both forms of trust come to
cross purposes, as with Nehamas’s example above. Second, when
members of non-WEIRD lineages live in the same country with
members of WEIRD ones, is a coherent set of laws possible? The
answer to both questions, I suspect, is sobering.
Before drawing my main conclusion regarding culture-gene
evolution, I want to reflect on a historical case of change in a norm
psychology that may appear at odds with the line of reasoning I
have been defending. Let us return to the study of parochialism by
Hruschka and Henrich.232 They describe a remarkable case of cultural evolutionary change that includes apparent changes in the
prevailing norm psychology.233 They describe how, over the past two
hundred years, the Iban, a population of about half a million, lost
the practice of head-hunting for spiritual rituals.234 Before being
colonized, the Iban comprised a kin-based, agrarian society in
which head-hunting was practiced when specific spiritual demands
warranted it.235 When a head was taken, it was always the head of

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
See id.
See HENRICH, supra note 1, at 21.
See generally Hruschka & Henrich, supra note 114.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
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someone from an outgroup—within-group killings were not tolerated—and it was a significant part of a religious ritual.236 As the
Iban were forced to relinquish their spiritual rituals, they were also
forced to change religions, adhere to Western educational practices,
take jobs outside their ancestral agrarian circle, and more.237 All of
this, as Hruschka and Henrich observe, constituted a remarkable
cultural transformation—an apparent example of deep cultural
evolution among moral, legal, and religious norms.
For anyone tempted to think this case undermines the generalization challenge, however, two cautionary points are in order. First,
it is not obvious that the apparent changes in the Iban’s normative
psychological mechanisms were changes of real depth. Altering
overt spiritual practices is often preferable to imprisonment or
death, especially if a person can covertly achieve inherited spiritual
ends by other means. The question is whether and how quickly
present-day Ibanians would revert to ancestral practices such as
head-hunting if the colonizing institutions abruptly disappeared.
Second, even if the apparent changes in norm psychology are
real—even if the adoption of Christian or Islamic norms have taken
psychological root and replaced ancestral Ibanian theology—it bears
emphasis that the evolutionary process sketched by Hruschka and
Henrich took place over two centuries and was largely a product of
unilateral violent force.238 Both points are important. A strife-ridden
period of two hundred years is ample time for on-the-street clashes
fueled by legal norms that fail to fit the psychology of the population. The generalization challenge, that is, might have arisen insofar as the Iban and their colonizers lived together for several
generations. In fact, it is unlikely that the generalization challenge
emerged in this case. The reason is simple. The challenge arises in
diverse populations only when genuine ethnolinguistic diversity
actually exists. The use of violent force to annihilate such diversity
removes the very conditions in which the challenge can emerge.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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V. NONGENETIC CULTURAL EVOLUTION
Nongenetic evolutionary processes also support the generalization
challenge, at least in the short term, across the lifetime of individuals. Those processes may also apply across generations, if relevant
genetic mutations happen to occur, or if, more likely, the children of
emigrants inherit and perpetuate the cultural norms of their
parents.
A vivid example of the evolutionary processes in nongenetic
evolution is reading. As far as we know, no genetic mutation
explains the difference between modern humans who read and those
who do not.239 What explains the difference are ontogenetic neurological changes caused by exposure to cultural products and practices.240 Learning to read produces extensive rewiring of parts of the
brain,241 as does learning to play a musical instrument,242 and more.
Of course, the downstream effects of reading or playing piano are
immense, and those effects may indeed result in genetic mutations
being selected for some further capacity.243 The assumption, however, is that instances of nongenetic evolution, when they occur, can
and frequently do produce substantial biological changes without
genetic changes.244 Parts of our biology are altered via cultural
selection before genetic mutations can occur and be selected for.
The same point applies to learning social norms. Like learning to
play piano, learning the norms of one’s social group involves not
merely the acquisition of relevant beliefs, but also the internalizing
of certain skills, affective expectations and responses, conscious and
nonconscious motivations, and more.245 One comes to believe, at
least in some cultures, that punishing another person requires that
the targeted individual is blameworthy and that persons are
239. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 5.
240. Id. at 84.
241. See generally STANISLAS DEHAENE, READING IN THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE AND
EVOLUTION OF A HUMAN INVENTION (2009); Stanislas Dehaene, Reading in the Brain Revised
and Extended: Response to Comments, 29 MIND & LANGUAGE 320, 324 (2014).
242. See generally R. Douglas Fields, The Brain Learns in Unexpected Ways, 322 SCI. AM.
74, 75 (2020).
243. HENRICH, supra note 1, at 5-7.
244. Id. at 5.
245. Id. at 16-17.
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blameworthy if they knowingly and voluntarily harm other persons
(and perhaps other sentient beings).246 In addition, one develops
skills with which to correctly apply such propositional knowledge.
One acquires skills with which to discern whether a specific individual acted voluntarily and knowingly.247 One also acquires the
appropriate affective response towards individuals who knowingly
and voluntarily harm another person.248 At the very least, persons
who successfully internalize a negative affective reaction towards
apparent norm-violators are probably better at identifying and
effectively sanctioning norm violators.
On the assumption that learning social norms, like learning to
read and play piano, involves the rewiring of parts of our brains, let
us consider two ways the evolutionary processes in nongenetic
evolution bear on the generalization challenge.
Some Neural Wiring Is Difficult to Reverse: The claim that
learning social norms involves neural rewiring is, I believe, plausible in light of the model of neural mechanisms of blame and
punishment proposed by Joshua Buckholtz and colleagues.249 The
success of any human lineage, it is assumed, rests in part on largescale social cooperation, which in turn rests upon the formation and
transmission of social norms along with the psychological mechanisms with which to discern, internalize, and act on those norms.250
As Buckholtz and colleagues put it, cooperation requires, among
other skills, capacities with which to detect and sanction norm
violators.251 The exercise of these capacities, moreover, “is not a
single, unitary cognitive process, but rather comprises a range of
distinct subcomponent processes.”252 They continue:
246. This, of course, is a view of punishment that depends directly on assessments of intentions. As the experiments described in Part I.B appear to show, some cultures appear to
sanction norm-violators without assessing their intentions.
247. See Joshua W. Buckholtz & René Marois, The Roots of Modern Justice: Cognitive and
Neural Foundations of Social Norms and Their Enforcement, 15 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 655,
658 (2012).
248. Id.
249. See id. at 655-60; see also Joshua W. Buckholtz et al., From Blame to Punishment:
Disrupting Prefrontal Cortex Activity Reveals Norm Enforcement Mechanisms, 87 NEURON
1369, 1376-77 (2015).
250. Buckholtz et al., supra note 249, at 1369.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1370.
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These [subcomponent processes] include evaluating an agent’s
action with respect to shared codes for acceptable conduct (moral
permissibility); assessing the agent’s role in causing that act
(causal responsibility); determining the agent’s mental state
during the act—especially his intentions (moral responsibility or
“blameworthiness”); appraising the outcome of the act, particularly whether and how much it harmed other people (harm
assessment); and, finally, arriving at an appropriate sanction for
the act (punishment).253

The core of their model concerns the roles played by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in deciding to punish normviolators.254 The DLPFC’s central function, they suggest, is to
integrate information concerning the violator’s blameworthiness,
which is keyed to the intention on which the individual acted, and
the severity of harm caused.255 This integrated information then
serves as the basis for deciding whether to punish the violator.256
For my purposes, the salient feature of this model is that persons
must learn to be competent judges of whether and how much
punishment is warranted by any norm violation. These, I take it,
are straightforward instances of learning how to conduct oneself in
accordance with social norms. One must learn the norms of his
culture, of course, but one must also learn the range of conditions in
which an action qualifies as being a token of the right causal type.
One might need to learn, for instance, to discriminate between
actions in which harms are knowingly and intentionally caused
from actions in which harms are caused unknowingly, or caused
knowingly but unintentionally, and so on. These sorts of judgments
require more than our species-wide mentalizing capacities.257 They

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
On the evolution of mentalizing, see generally SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHERS AND
OTHERS: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING (2009) (arguing humankind’s complicated and contingent form of childrearing developed human capacity for
understanding others). For recent work on the neural mechanisms involved, see generally
Melissa D. Thye et al., Differential Recruitment of Theory of Mind Brain Network Across Three
Tasks: An Independent Component Analysis, 347 BEHAV. BRAIN RSCH. 385 (2018) (elucidating
neural mechanisms associated with mental state detection and causal attribution).
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
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require, in addition, the acquisition of perceptual, memory, and
inferential capacities specific to one’s cultural context.258
This, then, is one nongenetic cultural evolutionary process that
alters neural mechanisms in ways similar to the rewiring that
occurs when we learn to read or play piano.259 That this general sort
of social learning is culture-specific is what matters most to the
generalization challenge. To see this, recall once again the second
set of experiments in Part I concerning the role of intentions in
moral judgments.260 Persons raised in intensely kin-based groups
are less inclined to discriminate morally between harms caused
intentionally and harms caused accidentally.261 By contrast, persons
raised in WEIRD groups tend to distinguish morally between
intentional and unintentional harms.262 Now, this diversity in norm
psychologies should raise doubts about the cross-cultural applicability of the theory proposed by Buckholtz and colleagues.263 For
present purposes, however, the important point is that the general
machinery of their model can be retained even if we jettison the
apparent assumption that punishment depends across cultures on
assessing intentions.
Part of the relevant machinery is the assumption that normrelated learning is, or at least can be, culture-specific. The culturespecificity of norm acquisition makes it reasonable to maintain that
the neural wiring acquired during such learning is itself diverse.
The first point, then, regarding the generalization challenge is
straightforward. In many instances, the neural rewiring caused by
learning to read or to play piano is not readily reversible.264 Of
course, much depends on the age at which one learns, as well as the
258. Indeed, as Henrich argues, “we humans do, of course, construct causal models of how
the world works. However, what’s often missed is that the construction of these models has
long been sparked and fostered by the existence of complex culturally evolved products....
[F]or much of human history until recently, cumulative cultural evolution drove the
emergence of deeper causal understandings much more than causal understanding drove
cultural evolution.” HENRICH, supra note 18, at 112-13.
259. See generally Fields, supra note 242.
260. See supra Part I.B.2.
261. See supra Part I.B.2.
262. See supra Part I.B.2.
263. See Buckholtz & Marois, supra note 247, at 655, 660; see also Buckholtz et al., supra
note 249, at 1369, 1374-77.
264. See S. Trojan & J. Pokorný, Theoretical Aspects of Neuroplasticity, 48 PHYSIOLOGICAL
RSCH. 87, 91 (1999).

2022]

DIVERSITY OF NORM PSYCHOLOGIES

1209

level of mastery achieved, and no doubt both skill sets, if not
utilized, will decay over time.265 It seems safe to assume, however,
that by the age of fifteen years, most persons who have learned to
read in their native language are unlikely to lose those skills altogether, even if they emigrate to a country where they have little
opportunity to use their native language.266 The neural bases of
their native language will likely remain robust even if they are
limited to reading and speaking only in their own homes.267 In some
cases, moreover, children of emigrant parents will learn to speak
and read some of their parents’ native language.268 There is,
therefore, a discernible degree of staying power in the neural
changes wrought by learning to read and to speak a culture-specific
language. Presumably the same is true of other complex skills such
as playing piano, driving a car, judging whether a singer is on pitch,
and more.
Second, and crucially, the same is presumably also true of the
neural wiring involved in learning social norms. The wiring changes
that occur as we acquire the necessary perceptual, memory, inferential, and affective skills are prone to persist for much of an
individual’s lifespan, and they might be acquired by subsequent
generations, at least in some cases.269 It thus is reasonable to
conclude that cultural differences in norm psychologies are likely to
persist for decades and, in some instances, for generations, even
among persons who emigrate to a very different culture.
When Social Learning Matters Most: A core discovery by cultural
evolutionary theorists is that social or cultural learning is most
pronounced when we act in the face of informational deprivation or,
more fully, when acting in the face of little or no nonsocial information.270 When that is the situation—when we have too little time
to investigate or when we know too little to extract additional
265. Lucía Vaquero et al., What You Learn and When You Learn It: Impact of Early
Bilingual & Music Experience on the Structural Characteristics of Auditory-Motor Pathways,
213 NEUROIMAGE 1, 2, 8 (2020).
266. See, e.g., Silvina Montrul, First Language Retention and Attrition in an Adult
Guatemalan Adoptee, in FIRST LANGUAGE ATTRITION 91, 94 (Monika S. Schmid & Barbara
Köpke eds., 2013).
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. HENRICH, supra note 18, at 62-65.
270. See generally LALAND, supra note 116.
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information from the environment—our default strategy is to copy
others.271 This is not a conscious strategy or one adopted by rational
deliberation. As Laland describes, copying is the default strategy of
countless species, from stickleback fishes to primates.272 In humans,
the strategic goals of imitation apparently range from establishing
trust and reducing suspicions, to burnishing and maintaining a good
reputation, to enhancing our social learning capacities with ever
greater copying efficiency and fidelity.273
Henrich agrees. Our evolved capacities for cumulative cultural
knowledge, he says, dispose us to copy and learn from others under
more or less specific conditions.274 When are we most likely to
imitate and thereby learn from others? He answers this way:
[W]hen problems are difficult, situations are ambiguous, or
individual learning is costly, people should rely more heavily on
learning from others.... [C]ultural learning will tend to dominate
our experiences and intuitions in domains that are important
but too costly or impossible to explore through personal experience or trial and error. Think religion and ritual.275

Religion and ritual are, of course, normatively loaded.276 Religious
institutions regulate behavior with a variety of norms, and the
normative pressures imposed by institutionalized rituals are undeniable.277 Yet even noninstitutionalized religious beliefs are
coupled with behavioral norms.278 If you eschew membership in
religious institutions but believe in a personal god of some sort or
believe you will survive your earthly death, those beliefs will likely
commit you to a range of prescriptions and prohibitions shared with
other believers.

Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 27-29.
HENRICH, supra note 1, at 62-65.
Id. at 64-65.
See generally HENRY NELSON WIEMAN & REGINA WESTCOTT-WIEMAN, NORMATIVE
PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION (1935); Matt J. Rossano, The Essential Role of Ritual in the
Transmission and Reinforcement of Social Norms, 138 PSYCH. BULL. 529 (2012).
277. See generally WIEMAN & WESTCOTT-WIEMAN, supra note 276.
278. Cf. Rossano, supra note 276, at 539-43.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
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Further, the norms that function in religious institutions or
personal religious beliefs have a powerful influence on moral and
legal norms. Many people, at least in contemporary Western
countries, see their deepest moral commitments as derived from
their religious commitments.279 Insofar as legal systems are
designed to embody the moral norms of the citizenry, the importance of Henrich’s observation concerning religion and ritual is
difficult to exaggerate: we rely heavily on social imitation when it
comes to internalizing and adhering to the religious, moral, and
legal norms of our culture.280
If, therefore, cultural evolutionary theorists are right—if we are
indeed most inclined to copy, imitate, and learn from others
regarding matters of genuine concern when it is impossible or costly
to learn from trial and error—then we ought not underestimate the
staying power within our psychology of the moral and legal norms
acquired while growing up. This point can be put as a question:
What nonsocial sources do most citizens consult or investigate
before internalizing the moral and legal norms of their culture?
Indeed, what nonsocial sources can they consult?
The force of these questions is particularly acute if, as Henrich
claims, the success of persons growing up in the normative landscape of their specific culture depends, in part, on their ability “to
preferentially target their interactions toward those most likely to
share their norms.”281 Our capacity to preferentially interact with
individuals who have internalized the same norms that we have
internalized is part of what makes human psychology so tribal.
Being tribal, moreover, was and perhaps still is causally integral to
the survival of our species (though it is simultaneously a looming
threat to our survival).282 The thought, of course, is that our ancestors, by sharing norms and thus cooperating as a group, successfully addressed local selective pressures and outperformed other,
competing species.283
279. See Ryan McKay & Harvey Whitehouse, Religion and Morality, 141 PSYCH. BULL. 447,
447 (2015).
280. See HENRICH, supra note 1, at 67.
281. HENRICH, supra note 18, at 200.
282. See generally JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP
BETWEEN US AND THEM (2013).
283. See HENRICH, supra note 18, at 166-84. As Henrich notes, cultural group selection does
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Thus, the point concerning social learning and the generalization
challenge may be put this way: the diversity of norm psychologies
is, at least in part, a product of cultural group selection, of processes
that selected for the capacity to preferentially interact with other
individuals whose internalized norms resemble one’s own.284 This
disposition is not a norm acquired via learning; it is an evolved,
built-in mechanism that makes cultural learning possible.285 It is,
according to theories of cultural evolution, a mechanism operating
at some depth in the social psychology of our species. As such, our
capacities as agents, by inclining us toward those who resemble us
with respect to internalized norms, thereby incline us away from
those who are normatively different.286 There is, at minimum, an
evolved affective and cognitive bias against what is different from
and potentially opposed to our own internalized norms.
CONCLUSION
As we imagine the future of law and the sciences of the human,
we see what we are presently able to project. It is reasonable to
project, for example, evolving notions of legal responsibility and
punishment—perhaps even the elimination of such notions—to
better reflect our knowledge of the neural mechanisms of human
agency.287 That is to imagine a better fit between law and the actual
constitution of organisms governed by law. We may even hope that,
by virtue of our laws, we become fairer, more forgiving, and less
barbaric.

not require direct confrontation between two or more groups. Id. at 167-68. Suppose one group
cooperates well and thereby satisfies the selective ecological pressures it faces. Suppose a
second group does not cooperate as well and is thereby gradually diminished by its inability
to satisfy the selective pressures it faces. That qualifies as cultural group selection despite the
absence of interactions between the groups. See id.
284. See id. at 200.
285. See supra Parts II-III.
286. Hruschka & Henrich, supra note 114, at 1.
287. See generally, e.g., Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Sapolsky, Nohwere, 63 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1079 (2022); Paul Sheldon Davies, Foundational Facts for Legal Responsibility, in
NEUROINTERVENTIONS AND THE LAW: REGULATING HUMAN MENTAL CAPACITY 319 (Nicole A.
Vincent et al. eds., 2020); Paul Sheldon Davies, Skepticism Concerning Human Agency, in
NEUROSCIENCE AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 113 (Nicole A. Vincent ed., 2013).
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When, by contrast, we project from what is presently known of
the diversity of norm psychologies, the imagined results are less
well-focused and by no means hopeful. That there exist substantively diverse norm psychologies across Homo sapiens appears
well-supported, as we discussed in Part I. In addition, if the considerations offered in Parts III-V are plausible, then the staying power
of deep differences in norm psychologies is also well-supported.
Indeed, the effects of cultural evolution on human psychology are
not optional merely because they are cultural. To the contrary, the
evolved mechanisms that make us the cultural animal par excellence are part of our biological constitution. It thus seems reasonable to imagine that the differences in norm psychologies between
distinct ethnolinguistic lineages that live in a single country will
likely produce chaos and confusion on all sides. Such confusion will
emerge to the extent that the norms of that country fail to fit,
psychologically speaking, the diversity of norm psychologies. If, in
addition, Henrich’s pessimism concerning our capacity to engineer
effective social institutions is justified—if deliberately imposing
unfamiliar norms on ourselves or others, even when done with good
intentions, fails to lower the probability of conflicts288—then the
generalization challenge cannot be seen as susceptible to an easy
resolution.

288. HENRICH, supra note 18, at 331.

